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Abstract
When individuals’ labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks,
should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two period general equilibrium model
with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare effects of these taxes into
insurance and distribution effects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes
on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks, the degree of heterogeneity among
consumers’ income as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump
sum transfers to consumers. When shocks affect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is
small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However in other cases a negative tax on capital is
welfare improving. (JEL codes: D52, H21. Keywords: optimal linear taxes, incomplete markets,
constrained efficiency)
1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the welfare effects of investment and labor income
taxes in a two period production economy with uninsurable background risk. More precisely, we
examine whether the introduction of linear, distortionary taxes or subsidies on labor income and/or
on the returns from savings are welfare improving and what is then the optimal sign of such taxes.
This amounts to studying the Ramsey problem in a general equilibrium set-up. We depart however
from most of the literature on the subject1 for the fact that we consider an environment with
no public expenditure, where there is no need to raise tax revenue. Nonetheless, optimal taxes are
typically nonzero; even distortionary taxes can improve the allocation of risk in the face of incomplete
markets. Then the question is which production factor should be taxed: we want to identify the
economic properties which determine the signs of the optimal taxes on production factors.
∗We thank Naoki Yoshihara for his valuable comments. Remaining errors and omissions are of course ours.
Gottardi acknowledges financial support from the EUI, Kajii from the Inamori Foundation and JSPS Grant-in-Aid
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1See Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a survey.
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A possible answer may come from the following consequence of the agents’ precautionary motive
for saving: under uninsurable risk, this motive implies that savings and hence capital accumulation
will be higher compared to the situation where markets are complete. This point was made in an
influential paper by Aiyagari (1995, p.1160) and in fact various papers thereafter suggested that
with incomplete markets, the precautionary saving motive leads to over-accumulation of capital and
hence that a positive tax on capital is welfare improving.2
However, the comparison between the level of capital accumulation with and without complete
markets has no clear welfare implication. If there were a policy tool which could implement the
complete market allocation, there would be little doubt for the policy maker to adopt such a policy
as far as attaining efficiency is concerned. But since a tax and subsidy scheme of the kind mentioned
above is not sufficient for completing the markets, this comparison tells little about the welfare
effects of taxation, not to mention whether or not capital should be taxed.
To properly assess whether or not positive taxes on capital are welfare improving when markets
are incomplete, one should rather compare the competitive equilibria with and without taxes, keeping
the other parts of the market structure, in particular the set of available financial assets, fixed. In
this paper we carry out this second best exercise. We find that subsidizing capital may indeed be
welfare improving in a situation where the equilibrium stock of capital is higher than when markets
are complete. This finding does not rely on the presence of upward sloping demand curves, so
that subsidizing capital further increases its level but nevertheless raises consumers’ welfare. More
generally, we identify conditions, regarding the nature of the shocks and the degree of heterogeneity
among consumers, under which it is optimal to tax or subsidize capital and labor, for different
specifications of the tax policy. In the rest of this section we outline the structure of this paper and
summarize our findings.
Section 2 describes the economy. Production occurs only in the second period, using capital and
labor, traded in competitive markets. There is a continuum of consumers, who may differ in terms
of their initial income as well as of their preferences. Each consumer has to choose how much to
work in the second period and his savings in the first period, invested to obtain capital, the only
saving instrument. Idiosyncratic shocks affect the productivity of the work of each consumer and
possibly the return on his savings.
A first component of the welfare effects of the introduction of linear taxes on capital and labor
is the effect of the change of equilibrium factor prices induced by the change in savings and labor
supply. To isolate and analyze this effect in Section 3 we consider an ideal situation where consumers’
savings or labor supply can be directly modified. This problem was previously investigated by Davila
et al (2012) in a similar setup, but they assume an exogenous labor supply and labor productivity
shocks only.
The main and novel finding we report here is the derivation of a decomposition formula: the
welfare effects per marginal changes in the stock of capital or labor usage around a competitive
equilibrium are decomposed into an insurance and a distribution effect as follows. A marginal
change in the stock of capital or labor usage generates marginal changes in the equilibrium prices
of factors. The welfare effects consist of those marginal price changes multiplied by what we shall
call the insurance coefficient and the distribution coefficient defined for each type of individuals.
The insurance effect and the distribution effect are given by the terms involving, respectively, the
insurance coefficients and the distribution coefficients. We will show that not only the relevant
coefficients have economic meaning but also their signs can be identified under natural assumptions.
2See for instance, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Chapter 15, pp. 535-536), Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009,
pp. 167-8 ).
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The insurance effect is related to the fact that with incomplete markets price changes affect
the risk allocation agents can attain by trading in markets, a pecuniary externality first noticed by
Hart (1975) and Stiglitz (1982). We show that the insurance coefficients tend to be negative for all
individuals and completely vanish if there is no productivity shock; intuitively speaking, if the price
of a production factor increases marginally, the risk in a consumer’s future income from the factor
is magnified, resulting in a reduction of welfare for any individual. Thus the insurance coefficients
multiplying the positive price change must be negative.
The distribution effect is due to the reallocation of income, among agents differently endowed
with capital and labor, induced by a change in relative factor prices. The distribution coefficient for
a factor roughly measures the relative utility gains and losses arising from an increase in the return
of the factor: it is positive for those who supply more than the economy’s average and negative
for those who supply less than the economy’s average. Thus in particular, the distribution effect
depends on the heterogeneity of consumers.
The decomposition formula is a powerful tool for investigating the signs of the welfare effects of
policy changes. When the shocks affect primarily labor, e.g. there is no capital productivity shock
(a case we shall refer to as the benchmark case), the insurance coefficients for capital are all zero and
only the negative insurance coefficients of labor is present in the insurance effect. So a decrease in the
total investment level, or an increase in total labor supply, which reduces the marginal productivity
of labor, and hence the wage level, contributes positively to welfare through the insurance effect
since the negative price change is multiplied by a negative insurance coefficient.
As for the distribution effect, the decrease in the wage level contributes positively to welfare for
individuals with negative distribution coefficients, by the same logic, that is whose labor earnings
are less than the economy’s average, but negatively for those with positive distribution coefficients.
The distribution effect due to the increase of the returns to capital, also generated by the decrease
in total investment, is similarly obtained. If consumers are all identical the distribution effect of
the decrease in investment is clearly zero. Otherwise its sign varies across individuals and will be
negative for the relatively poor individuals, who rely primarily on labor income, and positive for
the wealthy consumers who rely primarily on capital. If we evaluate social welfare in terms of a
utilitarian social welfare function, the total contribution of the distribution effect turns out to be
negative, and its magnitude increases with the heterogeneity of income.
Hence the decomposition result tells us that in the benchmark case, when the heterogeneity
among consumers is small enough, the positive insurance effect prevails over the distribution effect,
and hence a (marginal) reduction of the investment which will reduce the marginal productivity of
labor is welfare improving. It means that there is over investment at the equilibrium.
In Section 4, the optimal taxation problem is examined. The net revenue from the introduction
of linear taxes on the wage income and investment income is redistributed to consumers via lump
sum transfers and we consider different specifications of the way in which such transfer takes place.
These transfers generate an additional component of the welfare effect of the tax policy, besides the
change in equilibrium prices induced by the policy. Since it is difficult to provide qualitative results
about the actual level of the optimal tax rates, we focus first on the effects of introducing taxes at
the margin, to identify whether a positive or a negative tax on labor and/or on capital is welfare
improving at a competitive equilibrium: then the decomposition result sharply characterizes the
welfare effects of the price changes induced by the taxes. In Section 5 we follow up on each of these
cases with a numerical example, where we compute the optimal tax rates and show that the sign of
the optimal tax rates are typically in accord with our findings from the local analysis.
We begin by studying in Section 4.1 the case where the tax paid by each consumer is transferred
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to him in each individual state. Here the effects of taxes are analogous to the case where investment
and labor supply can be directly controlled: capital should be taxed (and labor should be subsidized)
exactly when there is over investment. So in the benchmark case, capital should be taxed when the
heterogeneity among consumers is small, but it should rather be subsidized if the heterogeneity is
large.
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we turn our attention to the case where the tax revenue is redistributed
to each consumer via deterministic transfers, so that the tax scheme also provides some insurance
and, possibly, some income redistribution among consumers. In this situation the decomposition
formula, suitably extended to include the welfare effects of the transfers, tells us that the provision
of insurance by the transfers strengthens the case for a positive tax, especially for the factor whose
income is more affected by the shocks. In contrast, the provision of redistribution tends to strengthen
the case for taxing capital and weakens that for taxing labor, since the main source of income is
typically capital for wealthy consumers and labor for poor consumers and transfers from rich to
poor are beneficial for social welfare. Thus the sign of the optimal tax also depends on the relative
importance of these two effects. We also consider in Section 4.4 the case where lump sum transfers
are not available, so that the revenue of the tax on one factor is redistributed to consumers via a
subsidy on the other factor. Curiously enough, we find that capital should be taxed whenever there
is under investment in equilibrium, exactly the opposite of Section 4.1.
The final Section 6 presents some concluding remarks and a discussion of the extension of the
analysis to general non-linear taxes and to an infinite horizon set up.
2 The Economy
We consider a two period competitive market economy as follows. The economic agents consist of
one representative firm and I types of consumers, with a continuum of consumers of size 1 for each
type.
The firm has a constant returns to scale technology described by a production function F (K,L),
where the output is the amount produced of the single consumption good, K is the amount of capital
input, and L is the amount of labor input, all measured per capita. The inputs are in efficiency units,
as is made clearer in what follows. We assume that F is smooth, homogeneous, strictly increasing,
concave and satisfies the standard boundary conditions, limK→0 ∂F/∂K = ∞ for all L > 0 and
limL→0 ∂F/∂L =∞ for all K > 0.
The firm maximizes profits taking prices as given: writing r for the cost of capital per efficiency
unit and w for the wage per efficiency unit, K and L will be chosen so that FK (K,L) = r and
FL (K,L) = w. The firm operates in the second period, when both the production activity and the
purchases of inputs take place, although other interpretations are possible.
Consumers of the same type are ex ante identical, i.e., have the same preferences and endowment
profile and consequently make the same choices in the first period. Each consumer of type i is
endowed with ei > 0 units of consumption good in the first period, which may be consumed or
invested. If invested, it will yield some amount of the capital good next period (which may also be
interpreted as human capital), to be sold to the firm at price r. Denote by ki the amount invested by
type i, thus ei−ki is the consumption in the first period. In the second period, any type i consumer
is endowed with H¯i units of labor hour (H¯i > 0) which can be supplied in the market.
Each consumer is subject to idiosyncratic risk. For each i, denote by (Θi, Pi) the probability space
which describes the shock affecting type i consumers. We assume that the shock is independently
and identically distributed across the consumers of type i, and independently distributed across
4
different types.
The idiosyncratic shock affects both the return of the consumers’ investment and the efficiency
of the consumers’ labor. In state θi ∈ Θi, an investment of ki units in the first period by a type i
consumer yields
Kθii := ρ
K
i (θi) ki (1)
in efficiency units of capital supplied in the second period. The level of the labor supply is chosen
after θi ∈ Θi is realized: writing hθii for the labor hours supplied after the consumer observed θi,
the labor supply in efficiency units Lθii is defined by
Lθii := ρ
L
i (θi)h
θi
i . (2)
Both ρKi and ρ
L
i are random variables on (Θi, Pi), taking strictly positive values with probability 1.
To preserve the uninsurable nature of the consumers’ idiosyncratic risks, we shall also assume that
the two random variables ρLi and ρ
K
i are comonotonic, i.e.,
(
ρLi (θi)− ρLi (θ′i)
) (
ρKi (θi)− ρKi (θ′i)
) ≥ 0
for any pair of states θi and θ
′
i. That is, if the labor endowment of a type i household is relatively
large, the productivity of capital tends to be high as well. Thus consumer i is (relatively) rich at
state θi if the corresponding ρ
L
i (θi) is (relatively) large.
We normalize units so that E
[
ρLi (θi)
]
= 1 for every i and write γi := E
[
ρKi (θi)
]
. We further
assume that the i.i.d. assumption of the shocks guarantees that the total supply of capital of type
i consumers is given by Ki = E
[
ρKi (θi) ki
]
= γiki while the total supply of labor is given by
Li = E
[
Lθii
]
in efficiency units3. Hence the aggregate per-capita supply of capital K is equal to
1
I
∑
iKi =
1
I
∑
i γiki, and that of labor is L =
1
I
∑
i E
[
Lθii
]
.
The structure of the uncertainty thus allows both for idiosyncratic labor income risk, as in
Aiyagari (1994), and idiosyncratic capital income risk, as in Angeletos (2007). Allowing for both
capital and labor risks generates some symmetry and allows us to identify the role played by each
type of risk in the comparative statics and welfare analysis. The special case where there is no shock
to capital income, i.e. ρKi is constant and only labor efficiency is subject to idiosyncratic shocks,
constitutes an important benchmark and we will refer to it as the benchmark case. It will be the
main focus of the parts of the analysis where the sign of the optimal tax rates are determined.
A type i consumer’s risk preferences are represented by a time additively separable utility func-
tion: the first period utility is given by a function vi of the first period consumption of the good,
and the second period utility is given by a function ui of the consumption of the good and leisure.
So when a type i individual chooses to invest ki and supply h
θi
i at θi, his consumption of the good
is ei − ki in the first period and wLθii + rKθii in the second period, and his leisure consumption is
H¯i − hθii in the second period at state θi. Thus his choice problem is given as follows:
max
ki,
(
h
θi
i
)
θi∈Θi
vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)]
, (3)
where Kθii and L
θi
i are understood as functions of ki and h
θi
i as in (1) and (2). We assume that both
vi and ui are smooth and concave, strictly increasing in the consumption good, non-decreasing in
leisure and again that ui(.) satisfies standard boundary conditions. We also assume that the random
variables are well behaved so that the first order approach is valid: i.e., we assume that the following
3Since the shocks are independent, the meaning of the expectation will be clear and so we shall omit the reference
to the underlying measure Pi.
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first order condition completely characterizes the solution to the consumer’s choice problem4:
−v′i (ei − ki) + E
[
uic
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)
· rρKi (θi)
]
= 0. (4)
uic
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)
ρLi (θi)w − uil
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)
= 0, at every θi, (5)
where uic and uil stand for the partial derivatives with respect to consumption and leisure, re-
spectively. Similar convention will be used throughout the paper, e.g., uicc stands for the second
derivative with respect to consumption, and uicl stands for the cross derivative. Furthermore, for
the special case where uil is always equal to zero, labor is inelastically supplied and condition (5) is
replaced with
ρLi (θi) H¯i − Lθii = 0 at every θi. (6)
Note that, since all individuals of the same type solve the same strictly convex problem, their optimal
decisions are also the same.
It can be readily verified that the consumption good markets clear when all the factor markets
clear. So in this economy a competitive equilibrium occurs when the firm’s profit maximization
condition is satisfied at a level of the aggregate supply of inputs. Formally,
Definition 1 A collection
(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
constitutes a competitive equilibrium if, for
each i,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)
is a solution to (3), and the profit maximization conditions, FK
(
Kˆ, Lˆ
)
= rˆ
and FL
(
Kˆ, Lˆ
)
= wˆ, hold for Kˆ = 1I
∑I
i=1 γikˆi and Lˆ =
1
I
∑I
i=1 E
[
ρLi (θi) hˆ
θi
i
]
.
By construction, equilibrium labor hours
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
for every type i consumer are a function of
the realization of θi, so are capital in efficiency units, second period consumption, and labor supply
in efficiency units. The comparative statics properties of the equilibrium and the sign of the optimal
taxes depend in particular on how consumption cˆθii := wˆLˆ
θi
i + rˆKˆ
θi
i and labor supply lˆ
θi
i := H¯i− hˆθii
vary with respect to θi, i = 1, .., I. In this regard, we shall focus on the following case:
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium
(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
is said to exhibit a standard
response to shocks (in short, is standard to shocks) if, for every i:
i) uic
(
cˆθii , lˆ
θi
i
)
is decreasing in ρLi (θi); i.e., uic
(
cˆθii , lˆ
θi
i
)
< uic
(
cˆ
θ′i
i , lˆ
θ′i
i
)
holds whenever ρLi (θ
′
i) <
ρLi (θi).
ii) Kˆθii is non-decreasing and Lˆ
θi
i is increasing in ρ
L
i (θi).
We argue that a competitive equilibrium is standard to shocks in ‘normal cases’. Regarding
condition i), intuitively speaking, a high realization of ρLi (θi) implies that the consumer is rich ex
post, and so consumption should be relatively high and hence the marginal utility from consumption
should be relatively low. Also, the amount of labor in efficiency units should be relatively high.
Formally, we have the following result which can be shown by applying some general comparative
statics result such as Quah (2007). We provide a direct proof for completeness in the Appendix:
Lemma 1 Assume that ui is strictly concave (uiccuill − (uicl)2 > 0 everywhere) and consump-
tion is a normal good (uiccuil − uicluic < 0 everywhere). Then in any competitive equilibrium(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
, condition i) of Definition 2 holds.
4This assumption is satisfied, for instance, if each state space is finite. Note that we allow consumers to borrow at
the same rate of return of savings.
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For condition ii), let us focus on the benchmark case where ρKi (θi) is constant, so Kˆ
θi
i is non-
decreasing trivially. A higher level of ρLi (θi) means a higher effective wage which induces more
labor, but it also generates a higher income from capital which induces more leisure. So Lˆθii should
be increasing when the income effect from the higher revenue from the capital investment is not
excessively large. A formal sufficient condition is stated in the following (also proved in the Appendix
for completeness):
Lemma 2 Assume that ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi ∈ Θi, and that ui is strictly concave and leisure is a
normal good (uilluic−uicluil < 0 everywhere). Then in any competitive equilibrium
(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
,
condition ii) of Definition 2 holds.
An alternative sufficient condition is the case of inelastic labor hour supply. Indeed in such case
condition ii) is obviously satisfied, and i) holds since uicc is negative and independent of l
θi
i .
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3 Welfare Analysis of Price Changes
We present here the key tool for our welfare analysis of taxation, the decomposition result. We
will see that, around a competitive equilibrium, the first order welfare effects of the introduction of
a tax scheme can be decomposed in a simple and economically meaningful way.
Taxation in our setup is ultimately an instrument which affects individual choices of capital and
labor. So suppose the social planner could directly control the amounts of investment, ki, as well as
of labor hours, hθii , for all consumers in every state θi. That is, the policy instruments available to the
planner can be identified with a tuple
(
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
. This may be interpreted as an extreme
form of personalized non-linear taxation without direct income transfers. All the other, non-policy
variables are determined in competitive markets: the planner cannot control the firm’s decisions,
and so the prices r and w are endogenously determined in such a way that the firm’s demand
for inputs equal the aggregate supply of inputs set by the planner. Thus, the associated market
clearing prices are given by r (K,L) = FK (K,L) and w (K,L) = FL (K,L), for K =
1
I
∑I
i=1 γiki
and L = 1I
∑I
i=1 E
[
ρLi (θi)h
θi
i
]
.
A feasible policy must warrant non-negative consumption to every consumer. So a policy(
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
is said to be feasible if for every i, we have non-negative first period con-
sumption ei − ki ≥ 0, non-negative second period leisure and consumption, H¯i − hθii ≥ 0 and
w (K,L)Lθii + r (K,L)K
θi
i ≥ 0 at every θi. By construction, the utility level of a type i consumer
induced by a feasible policy
(
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
with the associated aggregate quantities, K and
L, is given by:
Ui
((
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
:= vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
w (K,L)Lθii + r (K,L)K
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)]
. (7)
From now on, fix a competitive equilibrium
(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
. Clearly,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
is a feasible policy. We shall study how the agents’ expected utility level given in (7) behaves with
5Davila et al. (2012) consider the case where labor supply is inelastic and ρKi (θi) is constant, thus an equilibrium
in their set up is automatically standard to shocks.
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marginal changes in policy, differentiating the equilibrium values with respect to the policy and
evaluating them at the equilibrium values. Notice that a change in policy has two effects on Ui: the
first is of course the direct effect of the change in the values of ki and
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
; the second is an
indirect effect due to the change in the values of the equilibrium prices r and w. At a competitive
equilibrium, however, the direct effect has no first order effect on welfare by the envelope property;
in view of (3), the values kˆi and
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
already maximize the utility of consumer i at the prices
(wˆ, rˆ). Therefore, the only first order welfare effect of the policy change is the indirect effect, that
is, only the pecuniary externality of the change in prices. This in particular means that the only
welfare effect of the policy change is the change in aggregate variables, K and L, via its effect on
equilibrium prices. In conclusion, any policy changes which induce the same values of K and L are
equivalent in this context.
For this reason, as long as we are concerned with the first order effects of a policy change eval-
uated at an equilibrium allocation, we can take Ui in (7) as a function of K and L only, taking(
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
, and so also Lθii ,K
θi
i , as fixed constants, equal to the equilibrium values. Since
the first period utility vi does not depend on (K,L), the marginal changes in Ui coincides with the
partial derivative of the second period expected utility with respect to (K,L). For a change in K
this is given by:
∂Ui
∂K
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
=
∂
∂K
E
[
ui
(
w (K,L) Lˆθii + r (K,L) Kˆ
θi
i , H¯i − hˆθii
)]∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
,
= E
[
uic ·
(
∂w
∂K
· Lˆθii +
∂r
∂K
· Kˆθii
)]
, (8)
= E
{
uic ·
[(
∂w
∂K
· Lˆθii +
∂r
∂K
· Kˆθii
)
−
(
∂w
∂K
· Lˆ+ ∂r
∂K
· Kˆ
)]}
,
=
{
E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
+ E [uic]
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)} ∂r
∂K
(9)
+
{
E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
+ E [uic]
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)} ∂w
∂K
,
where uic is evaluated at the equilibrium levels of leisure H¯i − hˆθii and consumption wˆLˆθii + rˆKˆθii
in the second period, and ∂w∂K and
∂r
∂K are both evaluated at
(
Kˆ, Lˆ
)
. A similar convention will be
used throughout the paper. In the third step above, we used the relation
∂r
∂K
·K + ∂w
∂K
· L = 0, (10)
which follows since FK (K,L) = r (K,L) and FK (K,L)K+ FL (K,L)L = F (K,L) by the homo-
geneity of F .
Applying the same logic to a change in L, utilizing
∂r
∂L
·K + ∂w
∂L
· L = 0, (11)
we have:
∂Ui
∂L
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
= E
[
uic ·
(
∂w
∂L
· Lˆθii +
∂r
∂L
· Kˆθii
)]
, (12)
=
{
E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
+ E [uic]
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)} ∂r
∂L
+
{
E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
+ E [uic]
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)} ∂w
∂L
(13)
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3.1 The decomposition result
Notice that the expressions (9) and (13) exhibit a common structure: a marginal change in the
usage of a factor induces a marginal change in factor prices, which contribute to welfare through
multiplication of some common terms. By studying the nature of these common multipliers, one
can identify the economic sources contributing to the derivative of Ui.
First, look at the two terms E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
and E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
. To get an economic
interpretation for these terms, imagine an agent with VNM utility φ(.) and risky income Y and
consider the marginal benefit of insuring him by substituting an infinitesimal part of Y with its
expected value EY :
dE [φ ((1− t)Y + tEY )]
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= −E [φ′ (Y ) (Y −EY )] .
Recall that Kθii and L
θi
i are the two risky sources of income of type i consumers in the second period
of their life and Kˆi and Lˆi are their respective expected values. By analogy, the two terms above
can then be regarded as the (opposite of) the marginal welfare benefits from providing insurance
to the agent with respect to his two different risky sources of income (a reduction of r of w has a
similar effect, reducing the risk faced by the agent). So in what follows, we shall refer to these terms
as insurance coefficients for a marginal increase in factor prices, and use the following short-hand
notation:
IKi := E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
, (14)
ILi := E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
, (15)
where I stands for “insurance”. Note that their magnitude depends on the size of income risks borne
by each consumer at the equilibrium: when individual shocks are fully insured, e.g. Kˆθii = Kˆi for
all θi, the corresponding term, I
K
i , is zero.
Lemma 3 At an equilibrium which is standard to shocks the insurance coefficients are negative:
IKi ≤ 0 and ILi < 0.
Proof. By the definition of the standard response to shocks, uic and Kˆ
θi
i , Lˆ
θi
i move in the opposite
direction when θi varies, hence COV
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
≤ 0 and COV
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
< 0.
Recall that for two random variables X and Y , we have E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y ) + COV (X,Y ).
Here E
(
Kθii −Ki
)
= 0 = E
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)
by construction, so the negative correlation implies that
E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
≤ 0 and E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
< 0 hold.
The remaining terms in (9) and (13), E [uic]
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)
and E [uic]
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)
, can be interpreted
as follows. Note that E [uic] Kˆi is the welfare gain, due to a marginal increase of the price of capital
r, for a type i consumer supplying a deterministic amount of capital equal to the average holdings Kˆi
of the i consumers (thus abstracting from the idiosyncratic shocks affecting them), whereas E [uic] Kˆ
represents such benefit if the consumer’s supply were equal to the economy’s average holdings Kˆ.
Thus the term E [uic]
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)
measures the extra marginal benefit (loss) a type i consumer gets
because of his average holdings of capital being higher (resp. smaller) than the economy. The term
E [uic]
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)
can be interpreted similarly. In this sense, these terms represent relative gains and
losses at the margin due to the distribution of factor holdings across different types of consumers,
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and so for future reference, we shall refer to them as distribution coefficients for a marginal increase
in factor prices and write:
DKi := E [uic]
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)
, (16)
DLi := E [uic]
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)
, (17)
where D stands for “distribution”. Evidently, the sign of the distribution coefficient for type i is
positive if and only if type i supplies the factor more than the economy’s average. So in particular,
when the economy consists of ex ante homogeneous types, or I = 1, all the distribution coefficients
are zero. In general, their magnitude depends on the degree of heterogeneity among consumers in
the economy at the equilibrium.
Coming back to (9) and (13), observe that a change in the aggregate supply of one factor changes
both factor prices. Also, from the profit maximization condition we get ∂r∂K = FKK ,
∂w
∂K = FKL,
∂r
∂L = FLK , and
∂w
∂L = FLL. Using (14) - (17), and keeping (10) and (11) in mind, we obtain the
following decomposition result:
Proposition 4 The first order effect on the welfare of type i consumers of a change in policy at a
competitive equilibrium can be decomposed as follows:
∂Ui
∂K
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
=
(
IKi +D
K
i
)
FKK +
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
FKL = KˆFKK
{(
IKi
Kˆ
− I
L
i
Lˆ
)
+
(
DKi
Kˆ
− D
L
i
Lˆ
)}
,
(18)
∂Ui
∂L
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
=
(
IKi +D
K
i
)
FLK +
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
FLL = LˆFLL
{(
ILi
Lˆ
− I
K
i
Kˆ
)
+
(
DLi
Lˆ
− D
K
i
Kˆ
)}
. (19)
where all terms are evaluated at the equilibrium values.
We shall refer to the welfare effects where the insurance coefficients appear as the insurance
effects, and those where the distribution coefficients appear as the distribution effects. For instance,
the insurance effect of the change in the price of capital induced by a marginal change in K is
FKKI
K
i . The decomposition result shows that the overall effect of a change in the aggregate supply
of one factor at a competitive equilibrium is exactly the sum of insurance effects and distribution
effects.
This decomposition result provides a number of economic insights, especially about the sign of
the welfare changes. First of all, note that those consumers who favor a decrease in the stock of
capital are exactly those who favor an increase in the amount of labor:
Corollary 5 For any type i, ∂Ui∂K ≤ 0 if and only if ∂Ui∂L ≥ 0.
Proof. Compare (18) and (19): both FKK and FLL are negative by assumption, and the terms
multiplying them are identical but with opposite sign.
Consider next the insurance effects: when the equilibrium is standard to shocks, a marginal
decrease in factor prices yields a unanimous positive insurance effect, that is increase in individual
welfare, since IKi ≤ 0 and ILi < 0 for every i by Lemma 3. Since a change in K has opposite effects
on factor prices w and r, this property alone is not enough to determine if the insurance effect of an
increase in the stock of capital is positive or negative. But it still offers some intuition: when
∣∣ ∂r
∂K
∣∣
and
∣∣ ∂w
∂K
∣∣ are about the same, the riskier factor will matter more through larger (in absolute value)
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insurance coefficients. In particular, in the benchmark case of no capital shocks we have IKi = 0
for every i and thus the insurance effect of a marginal increase in K is generated by the marginal
change in the wage level, and hence it is negative for every household since ∂w∂K > 0 and the relevant
insurance coefficients are negative.
Of course, to find the overall effect on individual welfare, the distribution effect must be taken into
account as well. Recall that the distribution coefficient for a factor is positive (resp. negative) if type
i supplies more (less) the factor than the economy average. Since a reduction of the stock of capital
raises the price of capital and reduces wage, it benefits types i with DKi > 0 and D
L
i < 0. When
the (absolute) magnitude of the distribution coefficients exceeds that of the insurance coefficients,
always true in the benchmark case for a change in the price of capital, we find that a reduction of
K always benefits the consumers’ types who invest more and work less than the economy average.
Formally, we have the following result:
Corollary 6 When
∣∣IKi ∣∣ < ∣∣DKi ∣∣, ∂Ui∂K < 0 holds if Kˆi > Kˆ and Lˆi < Lˆ. When ∣∣ILi ∣∣ < ∣∣DLi ∣∣,
∂Ui
∂K > 0 holds if Kˆi < Kˆ and Lˆi > Lˆ.
Proof. Note first that Kˆi − Kˆ > 0 and Lˆi − Lˆ < 0 imply that DKi > 0 and DLi < 0. Hence by
Proposition 4 ∂Ui∂K < 0 follows when
∣∣IKi ∣∣ < ∣∣DKi ∣∣ , since FKK < 0 and FKL > 0. The second claim
is established by a symmetric argument: when Kˆi − Kˆ < 0 and Lˆi − Lˆ > 0 we have DKi < 0 and
DLi > 0 and hence
∂Ui
∂K > 0 follows from
∣∣ILi ∣∣ < ∣∣DLi ∣∣.
3.2 Effects on Social Welfare
We saw in the previous section that while the insurance effect typically induces a unanimous welfare
change across agents, the sign of the distribution effect varies across consumers, since it depends on
the relative size of an agent’s trade with respect to the average trades in the market. Hence we cannot
expect a change in K or L to generate a Pareto improvement when agents are sufficiently heteroge-
neous.6 We shall therefore use the utilitarian criterion in what follows, with the social welfare func-
tion defined as the average utility W
((
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
:= 1I
∑I
i=1 Ui
((
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
to analyze the total welfare effects of a change in K or L. This welfare function may be viewed
as evaluation “under the veil of ignorance” before the type of an agent is determined, where an
arbitrary consumer may be assigned to any type i with equal probability.
It is a benefit of the utilitarian function that the decomposition result readily extends by simply
summing up the derivatives of the individual utility functions found in Proposition 4 as well as (18)
and (19) as follows:
∂W
∂K
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
= KˆFKK
∑
i
1
I
[(
IKi
Kˆ
− I
L
i
Lˆ
)
+
(
DKi
Kˆ
− D
L
i
Lˆ
)]
, (20)
∂W
∂L
∣∣∣∣
(Kˆ,Lˆ)
= LˆFLL
∑
i
1
I
[(
ILi
Lˆ
− I
K
i
Kˆ
)
+
(
DLi
Lˆ
− D
K
i
Kˆ
)]
. (21)
With this, we are now ready to provide a rigorous and precise definition of over/under investment.
6The general constrained inefficiency result of Citanna - Kajii - Villanacci (1998) basically shows that with incom-
plete markets a competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by the first order effects if the planner has at least
as many policy tools as the number of households plus one. In our framework, the number of policy tools which can
have first order welfare effects is effectively two, K and L, whatever the number of households.
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Definition 3 A competitive equilibrium exhibits over investment if ∂W∂K < 0, and under invest-
ment if ∂W∂K > 0. Similarly, there is under supply of labor if
∂W
∂L > 0 and over supply of labor if
∂W
∂L < 0.
Even though the distribution coefficients have different signs for different individuals, the average
coefficients 1I
∑
iD
K
i and
1
I
∑
iD
L
i can be signed. To see this, think of assigning a type i to an agent
at random; Kˆi, Lˆi and E [uic] can thus be regarded as random variables over states i = 1, .., I
which are equally likely. Since
∑
i
(
Kˆi − Kˆ
)
= 0 and
∑
i
(
Lˆi − Lˆ
)
= 0, we have 1I
∑
iD
K
i =
Cov
[
Kˆi,E (uic)
]
and 1I
∑
iD
L
i = Cov
[
Lˆi,E (uic)
]
by construction. We should therefore expect
that at a competitive equilibrium the relatively “rich” types of households, whose consumption level
tends to be higher than the economy average, also tend to invest more than the average and work
less than the average. This property relies on some normality of consumers’ demands and so we
shall use again the term ‘standard’ to refer to it:
Definition 4 A competitive equilibrium is said be standard in distribution if {E [uic] : i =
1, .., I}, is negatively correlated with {Kˆi : i = 1, .., I} and positively correlated with {Lˆi : i = 1, .., I}.
When the equilibrium is standard both to shocks and in distribution, we simply call it a standard
equilibrium. An immediate implication of the above property is as follows:
Lemma 7 If I > 1, 1I
∑
iD
K
i < 0 and
1
I
∑
iD
L
i > 0 holds in an equilibrium standard in distribution.
Hence at a standard equilibrium, the distribution effect of an increase in K, given by the product
of the average distribution coefficients in the second term of (20) with FKK , is positive. On the
other hand, the insurance effect, given by the product of the first term in (20) with FKK , is negative
in the benchmark case where IKi = 0 for every i, by Lemma 3. Therefore there is over investment
if the insurance effect dominates the distribution effect.
Intuitively, the distribution effect gets magnified as the heterogeneity of income across types of
households increases, whereas the insurance effect has no direct link to this heterogeneity. We should
therefore expect over investment when the income disparity is small enough, and under investment
when it is large enough: subsidizing capital might be welfare improving indeed. Formally, we have
the following7:
Proposition 8 Assume that ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi ∈ Θi. A standard equilibrium exhibits over
investment if the average distribution coefficient is smaller than the average insurance coefficient:∑
i
∣∣∣ ILiL ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑i (DKiK − DLiL )∣∣∣. It exhibits under investment if the reverse inequality holds. In partic-
ular, if I = 1, a standard equilibrium exhibits over investment.
Proof. The fact that the productivity of the investment is not subject to idiosyncratic shocks implies
that IKi = 0 for every i. Using (20), we obtain that
∂W
∂K < 0 if and only if
∑
i
(
− ILiL +
(
DKi
K − D
L
i
L
))
>
0. Since IiL < 0 by Lemma 3 and
∑
iD
K
i < 0 and
∑
iD
L
i > 0 by Lemma 7, the latter inequality is
equivalent to
∑
i
∣∣∣ ILiL ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑i (DKiK − DLiL )∣∣∣. If I = 1, the distribution effects vanish by construction,
so the condition holds trivially.
Remark 1 The notion of over investment as well as the underlying logic of Proposition 8 are very
different from those in Aiyagari (1995). To see this, notice that our results hold irrespective of
7The special case of I = 1 constitues a generalization of a constrained inefficiency result in Davila et al. (2012),
which assumes inelastically supplied labor.
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whether a precautionary motive is present or not, or whether the level of the equilibrium interest rate
is lower or higher than its level when markets are complete. It is the nature of the shocks, whether
they affect primarily capital or labor income, that is crucial for the result.
Remark 2 Our local characterization results go through even when there are no shocks at all, so
that markets are complete. In this special case, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient and so a
change in capital or labor will result in an efficiency loss. Utilitarian social welfare can be improved
nonetheless, since it increases with an income redistribution from relatively rich to relatively poor
types.
4 Optimal Taxation
We consider now the optimal taxation problem where the policy instruments are anonymous, linear
taxes on labor and capital, with the net revenue of such taxes redistributed to consumers via lump
sum taxes or transfers. In this case, consumers choose optimally the level of their investment and
labor supply, while the firm still chooses the level of its inputs so as to maximize profits and prices
r and w are set at a level such that markets clear. An optimal tax scheme maximizes the social
welfare function under these conditions.
Our goal in this section is to study the welfare effects of introducing a tax and subsidy scheme
at the margin, asking if a positive/negative tax on capital/labor is welfare improving locally around
a competitive equilibrium. So throughout this section, we shall fix a competitive equilibrium(
wˆ, rˆ,
(
kˆi,
(
hˆθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
)
. We will denote by τK the tax rate on the revenue from the investment
in capital, by τL the tax rate on labor income, and by Ti (θi) the lump sum transfer received by
consumer i in state θi. Various scenarios can be considered, in particular concerning the specific
definition of the transfer policy Ti (θi), and we shall study a few cases which will clarify the essence
of the optimal taxation problem.
When consumer i invests ki and chooses h
θi
i in each state θi, an amount wτLL
θi
i + rτKK
θi
i of his
revenue next period in state θi must be paid in taxes. The choice problem of a type i consumer is
therefore as follows:
max
ki,
(
h
θi
i
)
θi∈Θi
vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
w (1− τL)Lθii + r (1− τK)Kθii + Ti (θi) , H¯i − hθii
)]
, (22)
where Kθii and L
θi
i are still as defined in (1) and (2). The maximization problem (22) remains a
concave problem, and so the following first order conditions characterize its solutions:
−v′i (ei − ki) + E
[
uic · ρKi (θi) r (1− τK)
]
= 0. (23)
uic · w (1− τL) ρLi (θi)− uil = 0, at every θi, (24)
where the derivatives of ui are evaluated at
(
w (1− τL)Lθii + r (1− τK)Kθii + Ti (θi) , H¯i − hθii
)
θi∈Θi
.
We will derive decomposition results analogous to Proposition 4 for the welfare effects of the
various tax schemes considered. The change in the levels of K and L are now induced by the taxes.
In addition, the lump sum transfer scheme may affect the income distribution directly to generate
further welfare effects. But we will show that the role of the coefficients IKi , D
K
i , and I
L
i , D
L
i
remains the same as in Proposition 4 to characterize the welfare effects of price changes, and we
shall demonstrate that the welfare effect of taxes can be decomposed into the insurance effect and
the distribution effect.
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4.1 Taxes with no redistribution of income
In order to isolate the pure substitution effect of the tax, we shall consider first a tax-subsidy scheme
which does not induce any redistribution of income across different types of agents nor even across
realizations of the idiosyncratic state θi. That is, the lump sum transfer is both agent and state
specific so that the taxes paid in state θi by an agent is returned as a lump sum transfer in that
same state. The following budget balance condition is required to hold for every realization of θi:
wτLL
θi
i + rτKK
θi
i = Ti (θi) , (25)
for every i. The implementation of this tax scheme is informationally very demanding since it
requires knowledge of individual trades and of the realization θi of the idiosyncratic shocks, which
may be private information of the agent. However, it provides a useful theoretical starting point for
the subsequent analyses.
Definition 5 A tax equilibrium with no redistribution of income is a collection (w, r, (τK , τL) ,(
Ti (·) , ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)I
i=1
) such that: i) for each i,
(
ki,
(
hθii
)
θi∈Θi
)
satisfies (23), (24), ii) profit
maximization holds, i.e., FK (K,L) = r, FL (K,L) = w, iii) markets clear, K =
1
I
∑I
i=1 γiki and
L = 1I
∑I
i=1E
[
Lθii
]
, and iv) the budget balance (25) holds, for each i at every θi.
Social welfare can then be written, analogously to the previous section, as a function of the policy
instruments, given now by the tax rates (τK , τL):
W (τK , τL) :=
I∑
i=1
1
I
{
vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i , H¯i − hθii
)]}
, (26)
where the variables are determined as in Definition 5.
By construction, a competitive equilibrium is a tax equilibrium, where τK = τL = 0, and
Ti (·) ≡ 0 for every i. Our goal is to find whether social welfare is increasing in τK and/or τL at
τK = τL = 0. To this end we assume the variables at an equilibrium with taxes are smooth functions
of (τK , τL) around (τK , τL) = 0.
8 We shall say that capital should be taxed if ∂∂τKW (τK , τL) > 0
and it should be subsidized if ∂∂τKW (τK , τL) < 0. A similar analysis can be done for labor.
Since individual income in every state is not affected by the tax scheme and the envelope property
again implies that the marginal changes of individual choices have no welfare effect, the first order
effect on welfare of the scheme is only due to the change in equilibrium prices. Therefore, as far as
the local welfare analysis is concerned, the effects of the tax policy are the same as those obtained
in the previous section, except that the changes in equilibrium prices are induced by a change in τK
and τL, not by a direct change of K and L:
Proposition 9 The (first order) welfare effects of taxes with no redistribution of income at a com-
petitive equilibrium can be decomposed as follows:
∂W
∂τK
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= Kˆ
∂r
∂τK
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi
Kˆ
− I
L
i
Lˆ
)
+
(
DKi
Kˆ
− D
L
i
Lˆ
)}
, (27)
∂W
∂τL
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= Lˆ
∂w
∂τL
∑
i
1
I
{(
ILi
Lˆ
− I
K
i
Kˆ
)
+
(
DLi
Lˆ
− D
K
i
Kˆ
)}
, (28)
where the coefficients IKi , I
L
i , D
K
i , and D
L
i are the same as in (14), (15), (16), and (17).
8This will be generically the case at least if the underlying state space is finite. The number of equilibrium variables
exceeds in fact the number of equations defining an equilibrium by two.
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It remains to identify the signs of the changes in equilibrium prices in response to the tax change.
In general, prices could move in any direction, depending on the signs of the derivatives of the excess
demand functions for capital and labor. We shall consider the case where prices change in the natural
direction as in the standard case of a market equilibrium with downward sloping demand and upward
sloping supply curves: at the margin, an increase in the tax on the revenue from the sale of an input
increases the gross unit revenue (i.e., cum tax) of the input but reduces the net unit revenue (i.e.,
net of tax)9; that is:
∂r(τK , τL)
∂τK
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
> 0,
∂
∂τK
[
(1− τK)r(τK , τL)
]∣∣∣∣
τ=0
< 0 (29)
∂w(τK , τL)
∂τL
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
> 0,
∂
∂τL
[
(1− τL)w(τK , τL)
]∣∣∣∣
τ=0
< 0 (30)
We shall refer to (29) and (30) as the natural signs for the changes in equilibrium factor prices.
We obtain a corollary similar to Corollary 5, which says whenever it is good to tax capital, it
should be good to subsidize labor as well.
Corollary 10 Assume the natural signs as above. Then taxing capital and taxing labor has opposite
effects on welfare: ∂W∂τK ≥ 0 if and only if ∂W∂τL ≤ 0.
We shall therefore focus our attention on identifying the conditions under which capital should
be taxed. The next result is an analogue of Proposition 8:
Proposition 11 Assume the natural signs (29) and (30). Then capital should be taxed with no
redistribution of income at a standard competitive equilibrium if and only if there is over investment.
Suppose, in addition, that ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi ∈ Θi and the competitive equilibrium is standard.
Then capital should be taxed if
∑
i
∣∣∣ ILiL ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑i (DKiK − DLiL )∣∣∣ and subsidized if the reverse inequality
holds; when I = 1, capital should always be taxed.
Proof. Under (29), ∂r/∂τK has always the opposite sign of ∂r/∂K. Hence the same is true for the
expression for ∂W∂τK in (27) and that for
∂W
∂K in (20), which establishes the first part. Given this, the
second part is an immediate corollary of Proposition 8.
4.2 Type dependent lump-sum transfers as insurance
We consider next the case of type dependent lump sum transfers. The amount Ti of transfer per
capita is type dependent and equal to the per capita tax paid by type i consumers, a deterministic
amount by the i.i.d. assumption:
wτLLi + rτKKi = Ti, (31)
for every i. Notice that this form of transfer provides some insurance to the agents, since the transfer
received exceeds the tax paid whenever the return on capital and labor is below its expected value,
and is smaller in the opposite case. Although consumers’ types need to be observable for this
scheme, the informational requirement is less demanding than in the previous case since the transfer
is independent of the individual shock.
An equilibrium with type dependent lump-sum transfers can be defined, analogously to Definition
5, by suitably replacing the budget balance condition (25) with (31). The corresponding welfare
9This property holds for instance with Cobb Douglas production functions and CRRA preferences, as we see in
the example in Section 5.
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function analogous to (26) has the following form:
W I (τK , τL) :=
∑
i
1
I
{
vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
wLθii + rK
θi
i −
{
wτL
(
Lθii − Li
)
+ rτK
(
Kθii −Ki
)}
, H¯i − hθii
)]}
,
(32)
where we used (31) to substitute for Ti in the consumers’ objective function (22) and the superscript
I highlights the fact this is a different function and the new insurance aspect of the policy.
Differentiating W I (τK , τL) with respect to τK and τL and evaluating it at τK = τL = 0, we
obtain the following decomposition formula for the policy under consideration:
∂W I
∂τK
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi +D
K
i
)
∂rI
∂τK
+
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
∂wI
∂τK
−E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
rˆ
}
=
∑
i
1
I
{
IKi (
∂rI
∂τK
− rˆ) +DKi ∂r
I
∂τK
+
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
∂wI
∂τK
} (33)
∂W I
∂τL
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi +D
K
i
)
∂rI
∂τL
+ ILi
(
∂wI
∂τL
− wˆ
)
+DLi
∂wI
∂τL
}
. (34)
where rI (τK , τL) and w
I (τK , τL) denote the equilibrium price functions for this case.
Comparing these expressions with (27) and (28), we see that there is an additional term in
each of them. This is due to the fact that the expression of agents’ second period consumption in
(32) differs from the one in (26) for one extra term, −(wτL
(
Lθii − Li
)
+ rτK
(
Kθii −Ki
)
). The
derivative of this term with respect to prices is zero at τL = τK = 0, hence it does not contribute
to the welfare effect of the price change. But its derivatives with respect to taxes, −w
(
Lθii − Li
)
and −r
(
Kθii −Ki
)
, do not vanish. Consequently, changes in taxes have an additional, direct effect
on agents’ utility, equal to −E
[
uic ·
(
Lˆθii − Lˆi
)]
wˆ and −E
[
uic ·
(
Kˆθii − Kˆi
)]
rˆ, These terms are
equal to −ILi wˆ and −IKi rˆ, respectively, which reveals the additional insurance effect generated by
the tax scheme.
Since insurance coefficients IKi and I
L
i are both negative by Lemma 3, we conclude that the
additional term in both (33) and (34) is positive. Hence the claim in Corollary 10 is not valid in
the present situation and it is possible that both the optimal tax on capital and that on labor are
positive. In contrast to Proposition 11 we find that, under the same conditions, in the benchmark
case the optimal tax on labor is necessarily positive when tax rebates have an insurance role. On
the other hand, the properties of the sign of the optimal tax on capital are unchanged.
Proposition 12 Assume the natural signs10 (29), (30), and that ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi ∈ Θi. At
a standard competitive equilibrium, labor should always be taxed with type dependent transfer while
capital should be taxed whenever there is over investment, that is if
∑
i
∣∣∣ ILiL ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑i (DKiK − DLiL )∣∣∣ ,
and subsidized otherwise. If I = 1, capital should always be taxed.
Proof. No productivity shock for capital implies IKi = 0 for every i. At a standard equilibrium, by
Lemma 7, we have
∑
iD
K
i < 0 and
∑
iD
L
i > 0, while by Lemma 3, I
L
i < 0 for all i. The natural
sign assumption means then wˆ > ∂w
I
∂τL
> 0 and so also ∂r
I
∂τL
< 0 by the profit maximization conditions
r = FK , w = FL. Hence all the three terms in (34) are positive, which establishes the first claim.
Comparing (33) with (27), we see they differ only for the term multiplying IKi . Since by assump-
tion IKi = 0 for all i, the derivative with respect to τK has exactly the same form in both cases. So
the result follows from Proposition 11.
10Strictly speaking, the natural sign assumption in the present framework should be stated by replacing ∂r
∂τK
and
∂w
∂τL
in (29) and (30) with ∂r
I
∂τK
and ∂w
I
∂τL
to reflect the fact that the equilibrum price maps are different. With a slight
abuse of language we avoid to make this explicit, here and in what follows.
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Remark 3 One might wonder why labor should be taxed even when there is under supply of labor.
Indeed, when
∑
i
∣∣∣ ILiL ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑i (DKiK − DLiL )∣∣∣, there is over investment and hence also under supply
of labor by Corollary 5. But under (31) the lump sum tax transfer may provide insurance against
private idiosyncratic risks. In the benchmark case, where ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi, this insurance
role kicks in only if labor is taxed since the idiosyncratic shocks only affect labor productivity. The
result in Proposition 12 shows that, under the natural sign assumption, the benefits from such direct
insurance exceeds the welfare loss from further discouraging already under supplied labor.
4.3 Anonymous lump-sum transfers as insurance and redistribution
Next, we shall consider the case where the lump sum transfer is not only deterministic but also the
same for all types, equal to the average tax payment across types:
wτLL+ rτKK = T. (35)
This form of transfer not only provides insurance, but also redistributes wealth across different types.
The transfer requires no knowledge of the realizations of the individual shocks nor of individual types,
and hence it is completely anonymous.
An equilibrium with anonymous transfers is similarly defined and the welfare function takes the
form:
W IR (τL, τK) :=
∑
i
1
I
{
vi (ei − ki) + E
[
ui
(
cθii , H¯i − hθii
)]}
, (36)
where for each i, the expression of second period consumption, obtained by using (35) to substitute
for T :
cθii = wL
θi
i + rK
θi
i −
{
wτL
[(
Lθii − Li
)
+ (Li − L)
]
+ rτK
[(
Kθii −Ki
)
+ (Ki −K)
]}
. (37)
Here the additional superscript R marks the new, redistribution element of the tax scheme.
We have so the following decomposition result for this case:
∂W IR
∂τK
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi +D
K
i
)
∂rIR
∂τK
+
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
∂wIR
∂τK
−E
[
uic
(
Kθii −Ki
)]
rˆ −E [uic] (Ki −K) rˆ
}
=
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi +D
K
i
)
(∂r
IR
∂τK
− rˆ) + (ILi +DLi ) ∂wIR∂τK }
= Kˆ ∂r
IR
∂τK
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi
Kˆ
− ILi
Lˆ
)
+
(
DKi
Kˆ
− DLi
Lˆ
)}
− rˆ∑i (IKi +DKi )
(38)
∂W IR
∂τL
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi +D
K
i
)
∂rIR
∂τL
+
(
ILi +D
L
i
) (
∂wIR
∂τL
− wˆ
)}
= Lˆ∂w
IR
∂τL
∑
i
1
I
{(
ILi
Lˆ
− IKi
Kˆ
)
+
(
DLi
Lˆ
− DKi
Kˆ
)}
− wˆ∑i (ILi +DLi ) . (39)
They differ from the corresponding terms in the previous section, (33) and (34), by−∑i {E [uic] (Ki −K)} rˆ
and −∑i {E [uic] (Li − L)} wˆ. This is due to the fact that the expression for cθii in (37) also has
two additional terms, −wτL (Li − L) and −rτK (Ki −K) , which describe the redistributive com-
ponent of the transfer. Differentiating them with respect to taxes11 we get −rˆE [uic] (Ki −K) and
−wˆE [uic] (Li − L), which are equal to −rˆDKi and −wˆDLi : that is, the above decomposition result
pins down the additional distributive role of the transfer. By Lemma 7 the sum of these terms,
constituting the new terms in (33) and (34), has respectively a positive and a negative sign. That is,
the new redistributive effect of the tax scheme strengthens the case for taxing capital and weakens
that for taxing labor.
11The derivative with respect to prices, for the same reasons as in the previous section equals zero.
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Proposition 13 Assume the natural signs (29), (30) and that ρKi (θi) = γi for all θi ∈ Θi. At a
standard competitive equilibrium, both capital and labor should be taxed with anonymous transfers if∣∣∑
i I
L
i
∣∣ > ∣∣∑iDLi ∣∣, i.e., the average distribution coefficient is smaller than the average insurance
coefficient for changes in the price of labor. Moreover, capital should be taxed if there is over
investment.
Proof. Under the stated assumptions, for the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 12,
we have again IKi = 0 and I
L
i < 0 for every i, and
∑
iD
K
i < 0 and
∑
iD
L
i > 0. Since the
natural signs assumption implies (∂r
IR
∂τK
− rˆ) < 0 and ∂wIR∂τK < 0, from (38) we see that ∂W
IR
∂τK
∣∣∣
τ=0
>
0 if
∑
i
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
< 0, i.e.,
∣∣∑
i I
L
i
∣∣ > ∣∣∑iDLi ∣∣ . Moreover, since the natural signs assumption
also implies (∂w
IR
∂τL
− wˆ) < 0 and ∂rIR∂τL < 0, from (39) we see that ∂W
IR
∂τL
∣∣∣
τ=0
> 0 follows from∑
i
(
ILi +D
L
i
)
< 0.
Compare the condition, obtained from (38), for the positivity of the optimal tax on capital in
the present framework, with the one for over investment we get from (20). Since both FKK > 0 and
∂rIR
∂τK
> 0, we see the first condition is now weaker, because of the additional redistributive effect of
this tax scheme. Consequently, whereas the optimal tax on capital is always positive when there is
over investment (e.g., when I = 1), the optimal tax on capital may also be positive when there is
under investment (in contrast with Propositions 11 and 12).
Let us understand why one might want to tax under invested capital to further discourage cap-
ital accumulation. When the lump sum transfer is equal for all types, the tax has an additional
redistributive element, since wealthier consumers tend to have a higher income from capital. That
is, the tax on capital in this scheme effectively creates an income transfer from wealthier to poorer
consumers, which is beneficial for the utilitarian welfare. Therefore, if the average distribution coeffi-
cient
∣∣∑
iD
K
i
∣∣ is large enough, an additional loss from reducing capital further, can be compensated
by an additional welfare gain from equalizing income, justifying taxing under invested capital ac-
cumulation and subsidizing over supplied labor in this case. This result indeed shows the power of
decomposition result, clarifying the underlying economics.
4.4 No transfer: taxing capital or labor?
It is useful to briefly conclude this analysis by considering the extreme case where no lump sum
transfer can be made, so that the budget balance condition is:
wτLL+ rτKK = 0, (40)
and the two tax rates can no longer be independently set, since τL = −τK rKwL . The corresponding
welfare function is obtained simply by replacing τL with this expression in W
IR, W IR
(
τK ,−τK rKwL
)
,
whose derivative with respect to τK is
∂W IR
∂τK
− rˆKˆ
wˆLˆ
· ∂W IR∂τL . From (38) and (39) we obtain so the
following decomposition formula:
dW IR
dτK
∣∣∣∣
τ=0
= Kˆrˆ
(
∂rIR
∂τK
/rˆ +
∂wIR
∂τL
/wˆ − 1
)∑
i
1
I
{(
IKi
Kˆ
− I
L
i
Lˆ
)
+
(
DKi
Kˆ
− D
L
i
Lˆ
)}
. (41)
In view of (20) and noting that
d
[
rIR(1− τK)
]
dτK
∣∣∣∣∣
τ=0
=
∂rIR
∂τK
− ∂r
IR
∂τL
(
rˆKˆ
wˆLˆ
)
− rˆ = ∂r
IR
∂τK
+
∂wIR
∂τL
(
rˆ
wˆ
)
− rˆ,
we have so:
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Proposition 14 Assume that d
[
rIR(1− τK)
]
/dτK
∣∣
τ=0
< 0. If no lump sum transfer is allowed,
capital should be taxed if and only if there is under investment.
This result is somewhat surprising as the sign of the optimal tax on capital, under a condition
slightly stronger than the natural signs (29) and (30), is exactly the opposite of what we found in
Proposition 11 and also partly in Proposition 12. So in the benchmark case with I = 1, capital
should be subsidized even though there is over investment. In the present environment, with no
lump sum rebates the tax has still a redistribution effect, given by the total net amount of the
tax paid by each individual, which is welfare relevant. The decomposition result reveals that what
matters in this case is the effect of the tax on the net, after tax return of capital rather than its
gross return, in contrast to Proposition 11.
5 Numerical Example
In this section we consider a simple numerical example for which we derive the level of the optimal
capital and labor tax rates for the different types of tax transfer schemes investigated in the previous
section. In this framework we will also illustrate the findings of the local analysis carried out in the
previous section, and compare them to the globally optimal tax rates. In principle, there is little
reason to believe that the local information around the competitive equilibrium is sufficient to
identify the properties of the optimal tax rates in the general set up we considered. But it will be
seen that, under the functional forms and the specification of parameters which are commonly used
in the literature, the results of the local analysis turn out to be useful to infer the properties of the
global maximum.
There are two types of consumers and so I = 2. Consumers have the same preferences and
second period endowments, as well as the same distribution of the idiosyncratic shock, they only
differ for their initial endowments. We set e1 > e2 without loss of generality. So type 1 consumers
are richer than type 2 consumers and we shall refer to the first ones as rich and the second ones
as poor. There are two equally likely individual states, Θ = {θH , θL} , and the common expected
utility is
U
(
c0,
(
cθ, hθ
)
θ∈Θ
)
=
1
1− σ
(
c0
)1−σ
+ E
[
B
1− σ
(
cθ
)1−σ − χ
1 + ϕ
(
hθ
)1+ϕ]
where c0 is consumption in the first period, and cθ and hθ are consumption and labor supply in the
second period in state θ. There is no shock to the productivity of investments in capital, as in the
benchmark case, and the shock to the productivity of labor is the identity map:
ρKi (θ) = 1, and ρ
L
i (θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas:
F (K,L) = AKαL1−α.
The values of the parameters are set as follows: σ = 3, ϕ = 1, B = 8, χ = 2.5, A = 1, α = 0.36.
We also fix the average value of the labor productivity shocks, θ¯, at unity, and the average initial
endowment, e¯ = (e1 + e2)/2, at 3.7162,
12 while allowing for different values for the magnitude of
12The values of σ, ϕ, α are in line with those commonly used in the macroeconomics literature. The value of e¯ has
been chosen so that, when the consumers are identical and there are no shocks, e1 = e2 and θH = θL, the equilibrium
level of consumption is the same in the two periods, as in the steady state of a dynamic economy.
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the shocks, identified by θH , and the degree of heterogeneity, identified by e1/e¯. Note that under
all parameter configurations considered, our example yields a standard equilibrium, and the sign
conditions assumed in Propositions 11, 12, 13, and 14 are satisfied.
Figure 1 shows how market incompleteness affects capital accumulation and labor supply. There
we fix the endowment distribution at e1/e¯ = 1.42 and e2/e¯ = 0.58, which implies a standard
deviation of about 60 percent. Then we let θH vary from 1 to 1.4 with θL = 2 − θH . Thus the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock θ changes from zero to about 57 percent. The solid
lines in the two panels of Figure 1 portray, respectively, the aggregate capital stock and the aggregate
labor supply at the competitive equilibrium of the economy for the different values of the standard
deviation of θ. The dotted lines in the same panels depict also the aggregate capital and labor supply
but at a competitive equilibrium where agents can trade in a complete market for contingent claims.
We see that aggregate capital is greater with incomplete asset markets than with complete markets
(due to the precautionary saving motive exhibited by the utility function considered). On the other
hand, aggregate labor supply is lower, due to the income effect caused by the higher aggregate stock
of capital. Moreover, the difference between the values with incomplete and complete markets is
larger when the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is also larger, that is, the uninsurable
shock is more significant.
In the subsequent figures we fix the values of the idiosyncratic shocks at θH = 1.2 and θL = 0.8,
and let the standard deviation of the distribution of the initial endowments, ei/e¯, vary from zero to
45 percent. Figure 2 plots the values of ∂W/∂τK and ∂W/∂τL evaluated at τK = τL = 0, that is, the
marginal effects on welfare of introducing taxation on capital and labor income at the competitive
equilibrium, as in the local analysis carried out in the previous section. Figure 3 plots the optimal
tax rates, that is, the tax rates that maximize social welfare W (τK , τL). In both figures, we examine
alternative specifications of the lump-sum transfers as considered in the previous section.
In each of the two figures the north-west panel corresponds to the tax scheme with no redistri-
bution of income discussed in Section 4.1 (see equation (25)). As shown in Proposition 11, taxing
capital or subsidizing labor is welfare enhancing (marginally at the competitive equilibrium), when
the distribution effect is relatively small. In the example here, the average distribution coefficient
increases as the inequality in the initial endowments rises. This can be seen in the north-west panel
of Figure 2: ∂W/∂τK > 0 and ∂W/∂τL < 0 when the inequality in initial distribution is sufficiently
small, and vice versa when it is large. This local result is in accord with the values obtained for
the optimal tax rates, displayed in the north-west panel of Figure 3. When the standard deviation
of income distribution is close to zero the optimal tax rate on capital is around 2 percent. The
optimal tax rate then decreases monotonically as inequality increases, becomes negative at the same
point found in Figure 2 and equals approximately -3 percent when the standard deviation of income
distribution is 45 percent. The reverse properties hold for the optimal tax on labor (whose level, in
absolute value, is slightly lower).
Secondly, we consider the case with type dependent transfers examined in Section 4.2 (see equa-
tion (31)). The north-east panel of Figure 2 plots again the marginal effects of capital and labor
taxes, illustrating the claim in Proposition 12. The sign of the marginal effect on welfare of capital
taxation at the competitive equilibrium is the same as in the previous tax scheme.13 This is in accord
with this proposition, since in our example there is no idiosyncratic shock to the return on capital.
Also, the marginal effect of labor taxation is now positive regardless of the degree of inequality in
the initial endowment distribution. The north-east panel of Figure 3 shows how the optimal tax
rates vary with the inequality in the initial endowment. With no inequality the optimal tax rates on
13The values are different since the derivatives of equilibrium price functions are different.
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capital and labor are both positive, equal respectively to around 6 and 10 percent. As the degree of
inequality increases, the optimal tax rate on capital decreases. Note however that it stays positive
even when the marginal effect of capital taxation at an equilibrium with no taxes becomes negative.
This is the region where the suggestions provided by the local analysis turns out to be misleading for
the globally optimal tax rates, but the size of the region appears to be small. The optimal tax rate
on labor is positive and increases with the degree of inequality, in accord with what suggested by the
local analysis, reaching a level of around 12 percent when the standard deviation of the endowment
distribution is 45 percent.
Third, we consider the case of anonymous transfers, discussed in Section 4.3 (see equation (35)).
The south-west panel of Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of taxation for this case, which illustrate
the claim in Proposition 13. The marginal welfare effect of capital taxation turns out to be always
positive and, in contrast with the previous cases, to increase with the degree of initial inequality as
we see in Figure 2. So in this case, in the economy considered in this example capital should be
taxed even when there is under investment. We see in Figure 2 that the effect of labor taxation is
also positive but falls as the degree of inequality increases, reflecting the fact that the distribution
effect works against taxing labor. The south-west panel of Figure 3 shows that the optimal capital
and labor tax rates are again in line with what the local analysis suggests: the optimal tax rate
on capital income is positive and increases with the degree of inequality, reaching a level of around
35 percent when the standard deviation of income is the highest considered. The optimal tax rate
on labor income is also positive though considerably lower and declines slightly with the degree of
inequality. As argued in Section 4.3, the nature of the tax transfer in this case strengthens the case
for taxing capital.
The last tax scheme we consider is the one without lump-sum transfers, analyzed in Section 4.4
(equation (40)). The south-east panel of Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of taxation for this
case. By construction, the tax rates on capital and labor income move in opposite directions to
balance the government’s budget. By comparing the south-east with the north-east panels we see
that under this tax scheme the sign of the marginal effect of capital taxation is exactly the opposite
to the one found for the tax schemes without insurance nor redistribution analyzed in Section 4.1, in
accord with what shown in Proposition 14. Thus the marginal effect of capital taxation on welfare is
negative with no inequality in the initial endowment, but increases as inequality rises and becomes
positive for a sufficiently large degree of inequality. In the south-east panel of Figure 3 we confirm
that the optimal tax rates on capital and labor behave as our local analysis suggests: the optimal
tax on capital ranges from -10 to 10 percent as the standard deviation of income distribution varies
from 0 to 45 percent.
6 Concluding remarks
Our results demonstrate that the optimal tax rate on capital may be negative. Moreover this finding
applies for equilibria exhibiting standard properties and hence does not rely on any pathological
properties, as the existence of upward sloping demand curves. In these cases, by subsidizing capital
and taxing labor the level of capital accumulation increases beyond the already “excessively high”
level of the equilibrium with no taxes. This arises because the determination of the optimal taxation
level is a second best problem, constrained by the fact that the attainable allocations are those
obtained as competitive equilibria for a suitably designed tax system, in the presence of incomplete
markets.
In the environment considered competitive equilibria are generally Pareto inefficient and the
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inefficiency can be decomposed in two parts: allocational inefficiency and production inefficiency.
The latter is caused by over/under use of capital/labor in our model. If the capital/labor ratio is
above the efficient, complete market level, a positive tax on capital should move this ratio towards
its efficient level, thus generate an economic surplus. Hence, it may seem hard to believe it could
ever worsen welfare.
This line of argument, while correct in a partial equilibrium analysis, is insufficient in a general
equilibrium environment with incomplete markets for at least two reasons. First, it ignores the fact
that the introduction of taxes may modify equilibrium prices and this, when markets are incomplete,
affects the consumers’ ability to hedge the risk they face. Thus an improvement in production
efficiency might occur at the expense of allocational efficiency. It is indeed the insurance effect in
our analysis what captures this trade off.
Secondly, the surplus can only be distributed via taxes and lump sum transfers as well as price
changes. The distribution effects capture these features. As our analysis has shown, these effects
will be different and have opposite signs for agents with sufficiently different income levels and
preferences. Furthermore, since the utilitarian social welfare favors equality in income, social welfare
may be improved by increasing income equality while sacrificing production efficiency, and this is
true even when markets are complete.
The answer to the question of what is the optimal taxation level with incomplete markets is a
delicate one, and one cannot deduce it from the partial equilibrium intuition. It is our contribution
to identify the insurance and distribution effects of the tax and the determinants of the sign and
magnitude of these effects. This in turn provides useful information about the sign and magnitude
of the optimal tax on capital and labor, in a general equilibrium setting.
We conclude with a discussion of a couple of extensions, the first one to the case where non-
linear taxes are also allowed. Our decomposition results show that the marginal welfare change
is given by the changes in factor prices multiplied by the insurance and distribution coefficients.
Linear taxes simplify the problem since equilibrium prices are just a function of two tax rates in our
model. With non-linear taxes they would be a more complex function of the tax schedule. However,
the decomposition result will still hold for the same set of insurance and distribution coefficients,
suitably multiplied by the derivatives of equilibrium price functions, as we saw in Section 3 for a
general policy which could be interpreted as personalized, non linear taxation. Thus it remains the
case that the welfare effect of taxation can be decomposed into insurance and distribution effects.
Although it might be hard to characterize optimal taxes, our first order analysis readily extends in
principle.
In our two period environment we cannot address important issues, as the intertemporal alloca-
tion of the tax burden, examined in the literature, starting with Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) in
a complete market setting and with Aiyagari (1995) when markets are incomplete. So an extension
to an infinite horizon set up is an important next step. Still, we contend that the findings of our
present analysis allow to gain some insights on the properties of optimal taxes in dynamic, infinite
horizon economies. In particular, the effects of taxes we find are quite similar to the effects of these
taxes on a steady state equilibrium of a dynamic economy. Building on this work in fact, in a
companion paper Gottardi, Kajii and Nakajima (2011) study the solutions of the dynamic Ramsey
problem of finding the optimal path of the level of public debt and linear taxes on capital and labor
in an infinite horizon model with incomplete markets.
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Appendix
Proofs for Lemmas 1 and 2. Consider the second-period utility maximization problem for a type
i consumer at θi:
max
c,l
ui(c, l)
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subject to
c+ wρLi (θi)l = rρ
K
i (θi)ki + wρ
L
i (θi)H¯i,
where ki has already been chosen in the first period. This problem can be restated as a standard
consumer problem in general equilibrium:
max
c,l
u(c, l)
subject to c+ pl = m+ pH¯,
where p = wρLi (θi) andm = rρ
K
i (θi)ki are taken as given. Writing c (p,m) and l (p,m) for the derived
demand functions for the consumption good and leisure respectively, and denoting by λ (p,m) the
Lagrange multiplier, the following first-order conditions characterize the demand functions:
uc(c (p,m) , l (p,m))− λ (p,m) = 0,
ul(c (p,m) , l (p,m))− λ (p,m) p = 0,
− (c (p,m) + pl (p,m)) = − (m+ pH¯) .
Recall that ρLi and ρ
K
i are comonotonic, and so are both p and m. Therefore, to establish Lemma
1, it suffices to show that λ (p,m) is decreasing in m and p. Since λ (p,m) is the derivative of the
indirect utility function with respect to income and the indirect utility function is concave in income
for a concave utility, it readily follows that λ is decreasing in m.
We shall now show that λ (p,m) is decreasing in p as well. To simplify the notation, we shall
omit reference to (p,m) below. To find the derivatives of λ (as well as those for c and l), we follow
the standard technique of differentiating the system of the first order conditions: ucc ucl −1ucl ull −p
−1 −p 0


∂
∂pc
∂
∂p l
∂
∂pλ
 =
 0λ
l − H¯
 .
The strict concavity assumption implies that the determinant of the square matrix above is positive:
4 := −uccp2 + 2uclp− ull > 0,
and we have:  ucc ucl −1ucl ull −p
−1 −p 0

−1
=
1
4
 −p2 p ull − puclp −1 uccp− ucl
ull − pucl uccp− ucl uccull − (ucl)2
 .
Thus we have:
∂
∂p
λ =
1
4
(
(uccp− ucl)λ+
(
uccull − (ucl)2
) (
l − H¯)) ,
which is negative. Indeed, using the first order condition, (uccp− ucl)λ = uccul − ucluc < 0 where
the inequality holds by the normality of consumption good, and
(
uccull − (ucl)2
)
> 0 by concavity
and
(
l − H¯) < 0. Therefore, Lemma 1 has been established.
Notice that the labor supply in efficiency units corresponds to
(
H¯ − l) p/w in the consumer
problem above, so in order to establish Lemma 2 it suffices to show that
(
H¯ − l) p is increasing in
p. From the system of equations above,
∂
∂p
l =
1
4
(−λ+ (uccp− ucl) (l − H¯)) ,
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and so
d
dp
((
H¯ − l) p) = (H¯ − l)− p ∂
∂p
l,
=
(
H¯ − l)− p4 (−λ+ (uccp− ucl) (l − H¯)) ,
=
(
H¯ − l)(1 + p4 (uccp− ucl)
)
+
pλ
4 .
Now,
1 +
1
4
(
uccp
2 − pucl
)
=
1
4
((−uccp2 + 2uclp− ull)+ (uccp2 − pucl)) ,
=
1
λ4 (uclul − ucull) ,
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the normality of leisure. This proves Lemma 2.
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Figure 1: Capital stock and labor supply with complete and incomplete markets. The horizontal
axis measures the standard deviation of the labor productivity shock (percent).
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Figure 2: Marginal effects on ex ante welfare of taxation on capital and labor under alternative
specifications of the lump sum rebates. The horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the
initial endowment distribution (percent).
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Figure 3: Optimal tax rates on capital and labor under alternative specifications of the lump sum
rebates. The horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the initial endowment distribution
(percent).
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